ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

EDITED BY Sandy Isenstadt AND Kishwar Rizvi
Studies in Modernity and National Identity examine the relationships among modernity, the nation-state, and nationalism as these have evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Titles in this inter-disciplinary and transregional series also illuminate how the nation-state is being undermined by the forces of globalization, international migration, and electronic information flows, as well as resurgent ethnic and religious affiliations. These books highlight historical parallels and continuities while documenting the social, cultural, and spatial expressions through which modern national identities have been constructed, contested, and reinvented.

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edited by Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi

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Contents

Preface vii

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction: Modern Architecture and the Middle East: The Burden of Representation 3

SANDY ISENSTADT AND KISHWAR RIZVI

PART 1 Colonial Constructions

1 Jerusalem Remade 39
   ANNABEL WHARTON

2 Modern Architecture, Preservation, and the Discourse on Local Culture in Italian Colonial Libya 61
   BRIAN L. MCLAFFERN
Preface

This book emerged from the symposium “Local Sites of Global Practice: Modernism and the Middle East,” held at Yale University’s School of Architecture, April 4–5, 2003. The symposium was organized to address a pressing issue in architecture today: the emerging friction between increasingly globalized economic and cultural relationships and an increasingly heightened sense of local identity. As symbols of indigenous character and political sovereignty continue to stream through the global media, architecture has become a powerful icon for the performance of local, regional, and national identities. Many architects find themselves choosing one side or the other, either promoting regional specificity or professing the international validity of modernism. Even as they strive to synthesize local building traditions with modern construction technologies, practitioners may inadvertently reinforce stereotypes or serve only the interests of a narrow stratum of the local population. Around the world, architects are absorbing and responding to local concerns with construction methods and materials that are by now familiar in any major city on earth.

The symposium brought together architects and scholars from a range of backgrounds to present papers and debate issues that proved to be more conflictive than the planners originally imagined. American-led troops had marched into Iraq just two weeks before, and the symposium opened to the news that American tanks were rolling into Baghdad. Many participants were impassioned and eloquent as they spoke about these events, unfolding at a
distance but very close to their scholarly interests. At the same time, a number of participants expressed their sense of frustration and the fear that any debates about Iraq, at the very moment that the country was erupting into flames, threatened to make their concerns irrelevant. But the looting of the National Museum of Iraq one week later reinvigorated some participants’ convictions that cultural understandings and misunderstandings had contributed to processes that had led to military action. With these essays, we illustrate how the long history of the built environment in the modern Middle East can both reinforce and subvert more explicit—and more catastrophic—governmental and institutional policies.

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Additionally, we would like to acknowledge those colleagues who contributed to the symposium but chose not to have their papers included in this volume: Gulsum Baydar, Layla Diba, Ijil Maazaffar, Hashim Sarkis, and Hasan Uddin Khan. We greatly appreciate the participation and insights of our colleagues Keller Esterling and Alan Plattus, and of our keynote speaker, Arjun Appadurai. We are also grateful to Richard Kane, John Jacobson, and Jennifer Castellon for their "local" support.

Many of these same individuals and organizations were unstinting in their generosity as we worked to transform the symposium papers into this vol-
ume of essays. Barbara Shailor, Robert Stern, and Ian Shapiro, director of the MacMillan Center (formerly the yclas), drawing again on its Edward J. and Dorothy Clarke Kempf Memorial Fund, marshaled considerable resources on behalf of this project, and we thank them. We are honored to have received support from Yale University's Hilles Publication Fund and from the Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts.

The primary motivation for compiling this book was the students in our classes on "Global Modernism" and "Modernism in the Middle East," whose curiosity and interest encouraged us to undertake the project. Additionally, we are grateful for the provocative comments of colleagues and students at Columbia University in New York and Zayed University in Dubai, where material from the introductory essay was presented. In particular, we thank Nasser Rabbat for his perceptive comments on the essay. For the assistance they lent to this volume, we also thank Zachary Heineman and Brad Walters. Finally, we would like to thank Michael Duckworth, Sibel Bozdoğan, Reşat Kasaba, and Beth Fuget, in their various roles at the University of Washington Press, for their tireless efforts to develop and advance Modernism and the Middle East.
Introduction

Modern Architecture and the Middle East: The Burden of Representation

SANDY ISENSTADT AND KISHWAR RIZVI

The essays in this volume investigate the contribution that local Middle Eastern contexts make to discourses in international modernism. The essayists define modernization not only as the extension of industrialized building processes and urban infrastructure, but also as the spread of ideals of progress and standards of comfort—which is to say, modernization is the ideology as well as the built framework for the administration of industrial societies. Architecture can help consolidate identity by providing both a degree of social cohesion and iconic forms that can become a source of pride for communities. Yet, for others, such architectural forms can become stereotypes that flatten culture into a mere sign. Throughout these essays, one discerns an abiding concern for questions of representation, for how buildings and monuments—or in some cases, the lack of them—acquire meaning, harden conviction, and set the spatial infrastructure for subsequent generations.

The Middle East, with its diverse social, religious, and national histories, has often been seen by architects and academics as rich in traditional architecture but poor as a resource for understanding the Modern period. Europeans have idealized the Middle East as an almost timeless place, a region that stands in distinct and didactic contrast with the disruptive displacement and disillusionment that has resulted from its own industrialization. These essays describe the unique ways by which Middle Eastern countries have invented their own versions of modernism, sometimes aligned and sometimes
at odds with more familiar European versions, and in varying relations with larger patterns of imperialism and colonialism. When individual designers and decision makers crossed national borders to build or to learn, to provide aid or extract resources, as architects, teachers, or tourists, the dichotomies of modern-traditional or Western-Eastern did not truly hold.

Our goal here is to build into the study of transnational architectural exchange the widest consideration of constituencies and the most extended opportunities for input. Contributors examine a wide range of cultural encounters in terms of institutionalization of relationships, dynamic interactions of bureaucratic structures, and patterns of patronage amid debates over design and urban planning. Even local histories are multiple, often disputed in their formation, and inevitably shifting over time. Taken together, they illustrate the various strategies that set national policies and decide who is housed and who goes wanting, who is remembered and who is forgotten, and who is empowered to remake the built landscape.

Several essays profile the individuals who helped realize certain specifically Middle Eastern forms of modernity. Some of them, such as European art historians and expatriate architects and archeologists, positioned themselves as the arbiters of Western knowledge, while others were seen as importing Western ideals and technologies to the Middle East. In other cases, institutions, such as governments or development agencies, assumed these roles. In many instances, however, cultural authority was as much a matter of dynamic transitions in political or architectural sympathies as it was the result of official credentials. These essays call attention to circuits of intention and response, which inflated allegedly objective depictions of technological progress into heated debates regarding the nature of modernity itself.

Modernism and the Middle East contextualizes the challenges facing building efforts today by placing them within a larger historical trajectory stretching from colonialism and the rise of nation-states to the present postcolonial search for local identity. By detailing how architecture has been integral to complex political ambitions and economic programs, the contributors make evident the historical roles played by competing visions of the built environment, as forms of representation and as a means of directing capital and labor flows. With such attention to its deep traditions and rapid modernization, the Middle East emerges as a rich setting for the study of modern architecture.

Modernism and the Middle East begins at the cusp of the twentieth century amid the decline of colonialism and the rise of independent nation-states in regions once ruled by the Ottomans (r. 1290–1924) in present-day Turkey and North Africa, and the Qajars (r. 1779–1924) in Iran (see fig. 1.1). Under the dynastic leadership of the Sultan, overseer of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina and the supreme ruler of the Sunni Islamic world, the relatively stable and unified Ottoman Empire had administered much of today’s Middle East. But this administrative unity and geographic cohesion was eroded greatly during the nineteenth century, and it dissolved completely in the twentieth. Beyond the actual loss of land, Ottoman rule was disrupted by major infrastructure developments, most notably the Suez Canal (1854–69), which brought French and, later, English capital and technology to Egypt.

By the twilight of World War I, in 1918, Istanbul had itself come under Allied control, and the six-hundred-year-old Ottoman Empire came to an end, its former lands divided into areas administered by the French (Syria and Lebanon) and the British (Iraq and Palestine). Even as new nations emerged with at least nominal sovereignty from the Mandate period, the idea of a coherent, if not exactly cohesive, Middle East was reinforced. The Mandates carved new political entities, such as Palestine and Iraq, out of former Ottoman administrative zones, but it kept these nations from being fully independent, and left them wanting in terms of industrial development. At the same time, European occupation sparked nationalist movements in neighboring Turkey and Iran, resulting in the overthrow of puppet monarchies and the rise of charismatic military leaders, who threw off centuries of imperial rule and modernized in the name of national progress. The advent of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey (1919) and Riza Khan in Iran (1921) brought new modes of judicial and educational reforms (often based on European models), in an effort to forge homogeneous, if fictive, native identities. The characterization of entire peoples by their positions along the trajectory of history and modernization was as much embraced by regional leaders as it was imposed by European power and ideology.

Oil came to be written into this idea of a cohesive Middle East as much by its discovery there as by the increasing industrial thirst for sources of fuel. The image of Arab states unified by oceans of oil lying unseen beneath their soil emerged in the nineteenth century with the advent of a British-controlled Anglo-Persian oil company. It was extended as new fields were discovered, such as those in Iraq in the 1930s and those in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by 1945. With the institution of the American’s Marshall Plan (1948–52), the European economy was reconfigured according to American precepts, resulting in an emphasis on continued growth in productivity and an even greater dependence on oil. The Middle East thus moved to the center of foreign-policy strategies for a number of Western nations, becoming also a
site of contentious ideological positioning between the Soviet Union and the United States, with both nations acting out their political differences through technical aid and development projects as well as cultural exports. Although some small Persian Gulf monarchies enjoyed considerable advantages over their oil-poor neighbors, to Westerners the region maintained its conceptual integrity as a site of superpower struggle and vast economic opportunity.

The creation of the state of Israel, on May 14, 1948, also helped consolidate an idea of the Middle East, albeit in a way unanticipated by most Western politicians. Although Jewish immigration to the area in the first half of the twentieth century had profoundly affected the economic and demographic character of Mandate Palestine, the United Nations’ 1947 plan to partition the area into Jewish and Arab states, which was rejected by the Arab League, formed in 1945, seemed only to reassert Western colonialism at the very moment it was breaking apart elsewhere.

Within this context, the Middle East must be historically situated as a place defined both by European colonial interests and by the specific imperial configurations that had existed in the region. Just as the specter of essentialism hovers over the term “Middle East,” one may argue that it also haunts the idea of a homogeneous “Europe”; nonetheless, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued in another context, these terms highlight, rather than obscure, the problematic of domination and intellectual dependency that permeates any discussion of these two entities. The interdependency of Europe and the Middle East can be seen in the unfolding of an “Oriental” supplement to European identity: what was understood by nineteenth-century policymakers as the “Eastern question” had to do less with the inhabitants of these regions than with the raw currency of human labor and material wealth promised through imperialism.

Along with unabashed military power, European systems of social organization also marched across the region. By the end of the nineteenth century, in Istanbul as well as Tehran, there were two primary modes of thinking about Islamic government. On the one hand, an indigenous intelligentsia, educated at European institutions, subscribed to the idea of nations organized to uphold individual rights, and so demanded constitutional government. On the other hand, reformers, who interpreted Islamic law and rule as being consistent with individual freedom, called for an Islamic revival from within these very institutions. These tensions resulted in a series of experiments with European legal institutions and, in the early twentieth century, fully developed, albeit short-lived constitutions in Turkey and Iran.

In the early years of the twentieth century, intellectuals in both Europe and the Middle East looked to an idea of the “East” in search of alternative modes of living, an expression of their dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the artifacts of modernity. The political fragmentation of great empires, rapid industrialization, and an expanding urban malaise and the alienation it produced were all motivating factors for a renewed interest in Eastern art and religion. This interest was filtered through notions of racial and cultural superiority, however, and the lands of the Middle East became subject to orientalist interpretations, both by natives and by their European counterparts. The orientalist interpretation was very different from the lived experience of those in the Middle East: independence movements, increasing autonomy for the arts, and the growth of a middle class were all phenomena that the residents of cities as diverse as Cairo, Tehran, and Algiers experienced. This shared experience of modernity, seldom implemented on the basis of parity, demands closer scrutiny.

WRITING A MIDDLE EAST

Several sites in the Middle East were of particular interest to European and American archæologists, who since the late nineteenth century had focused almost obsessively on the search for biblical and classical origins of mankind. When their attention turned toward the Islamic period, it too was centered on questions of origins. Excavations were begun at Ummayad palaces and mosques in Syria, and at the Abbasid capitals of Baghdad and Samarra in Iraq, while monuments built during the six hundred-year reign of the Ottomans were ignored. From as early as the seventeenth century, documentation and description by travelers, such as Adam Olearius and Engelbert Kaempfer in Iran, had made certain cities and monuments familiar to Europeans, although whole-scale architectural documentation emerged only later through diplomatic commissions, such as those undertaken in the nineteenth century by Charles Texier (1802—1871) and Pascale Coste (1787—1879). Coste’s two significant works, Monumentes modernes de la Perse, mesures, dessins et décrits (1867) and the monumental Architecture Arabe; ou, Monument du Kaïrè: Mesures et dessins, de 1818 à 1826 (1839), were milestones in the manner in which architecture was disassembled and presented to the viewer in an academic, Beaux-Arts style. The documentation already undertaken by the French, in the Description de l’Egypte (1828), for example, on the occasion of Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt, and by the British in India (e.g., Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan [1829] by General James Tod), would fall into the category of colonial ethnog.
raphy. By contrast, Coste’s works were valued primarily for the architectural information they contained, although they too were arguably still within the colonial frame. The travel documentary would be the precursor to the more academic surveys, which would provide an intellectual and art historical interpretation for the works catalogued.

European museums and their local counterparts played a significant role in constructing a visual and architectural documentary of the Middle East. Among the earliest museum collections of Near Eastern art were those in Istanbul, London, Berlin, and Vienna. These museums were advised and supplied by a series of scholars influential in the study of Islamic art. Friedrich Sarre (1865–1945), for instance, served as a director of the Berlin Museum and was an influential collector of Islamic art. He had traveled extensively in the Middle East and made valuable contributions to the study of Islamic architecture in the form of publications and documentary photographs. Sarre worked closely with his protégé, Ernst Herzfeld (1879–1948), who had been educated in the classics and trained as an architect. Together they curated the influential 1910 Munich exhibition of Islamic art, which was a milestone in its scope and execution. Exhibitions like these were spectacles of European fantasies of the Middle East, and their catalogues would become important guides for the collecting and dissemination of the artifacts displayed.

Europeans saw proof of their superior stewardship of cultural artifacts when they compared their own concern for national treasures to the relative lack of interest in and disrepair of historic sites in the Middle East. Not only were viewpoints about the art and architectural history of the region skewed to European preoccupations, but the very artifacts under study were often removed and sometimes destroyed in the process of radical decontextualization. Although the Europeans were primarily focused on the ancient Babylonian and Pharaonic periods, they did include Islamic art in their collections, although typically the art was represented with easily transported objects like textiles and ceramics. When they did transport entire buildings or large fragments, these heroic feats only added to the sense of authority which legitimated the dismemberment and expatriation of the region’s architectural heritage (see fig. 1.2). The fate of these objects shifted according to what was in vogue among European and nationalist scholars, highlighting the close association of academic research with political rivalry and self-definition. It is important to note here the close affinity that would form between orientalist interests in the region and the later co-opting of rhetoric by the newly formed states of the Middle East.

Institutions that claimed authority over cultural heritage came to wield significant political influence in the remaining colonies, as well as in the new states. In the Middle East, directors and officials were appointed from among European scholars and administrators to head museums and other institutions charged with the study and conservation of Islamic monuments. In Egypt, for example, although the Committee for the Conservation of Monuments of Arab Art, convened in 1881, included three Europeans and five Arabs, decision making was controlled by European officials. With the founding of the Museum of Arab Art the cultural authority of the British in Cairo was secure for the next fifty years, as all decisions regarding the collection and display of Arab art were filtered through colonial authorities. In a similar vein, in 1887 Osman Hamdi Bey was put in charge of the Imperial Ottoman Museum in Istanbul. This museum, however, housed artifacts from classical antiquity (a Museum of Islamic Art would open, in the Suleymaniye Mosque complex, only in 1914). In Iran, even before Riza Khan declared himself Shah and initiated programs for education, industrialization, and a liberal government, the Society for National Heritage was charged with overseeing the restoration and conservation, and thus the very identification of that nation’s “national heritage.” The society undertook not only to restore
old monuments, but to “invent” new ones: for example, in 1926, the grave of the famous eleventh-century poet Firdawsi was dug up and a new, “authentic,” structure, designed by André Godard, was erected in its place (it was completed in 1934). 16 Riza Shah invited Ernst Herzfeld to come to Iran in 1925 to explain to the nation’s citizenry the importance of the nation’s legacy of Persian art. Herzfeld was also invited to survey crucial Persian monuments and make recommendations for their preservation and possible reconstruction. 17 The result was A Brief Inventory of the Historical Heritage and Edifices of Iran (1925), a founding document in the Iranians’ understanding of their architectural history. The document’s bias was toward the pre-Islamic past of the Achaemenid and Sasanian periods; their immediate precedent, the Qajar reign, was deemed by the Pahlavi nationalists as having been a dishonorable and deviant moment in Iranian art and history. The ensuing cultural knowledge was mobilized by political forces in Iran to bolster claims to power and to legitimate policies and directions of development. Architecture was in the forefront of the imagining of an Iranian heritage—real and fictional. 18

Perhaps the most influential figure writing about Islamic architecture was Keppel Archibald Creswell (1869–1974). 19 Trained at the Technical College in Finsbury (England) in electrical engineering, Creswell was an accomplished draftsman. Although his early employment was at Siemens and the London branch of Deutsche Bank, his real passion was, as he noted, early Muslim architecture. He trained himself in the architectural history of the Middle East—in particular, Iran. By 1920, Creswell found himself in Egypt, employed by the British army, and he took advantage of his appointment to study the local monuments. At the end of World War I, Creswell requested and received the help of King Fu’ad I of Egypt to assist in funding his magnum opus, Early Muslim Architecture (1932–40). The project, as Creswell described it, would catalogue “one of the greatest and most interesting branches of Muslim architecture, which will make known in all parts of the world the glorious achievements, as well as the history and evolution, of modern architecture in Egypt.” 20 The statement is valuable in pointing to the mixed goals increasingly common to students of Islamic architecture in the early twentieth century: to both locate and describe a glorious past, and, as Creswell wrote to King Fu’ad, to inspire the future.

The relationship of the architectural and artistic past, present, and future of Iran was explored by Creswell’s contemporary, the American scholar-turned-purveyor, Arthur Upham Pope (1881–1969). 21 In a 1925 speech given in the presence of Riza Khan, Pope had advocated the study and preserva-
constructed. The past and its corresponding future were determined by the exigencies and particularities of each country and its self-representation at different moments in time.

BUILDING A MIDDLE EAST

In 1881, the Fine Arts Academy was established in Istanbul, under the directorship of Osman Hamdi Bey (1842–1910), an artist trained in Paris in the studio of Jean-Léon Gérôme. The academy was the first of its kind there to teach architecture, a subject traditionally offered only to engineering students, as part of a curriculum that included painting and sculpture. One result of this was fresh attention given to historicism and the role of the past in constructing contemporary architecture, such that architects attempted to revive Ottoman architecture by applying its formal motifs to new functional programs such as banks and post offices. Architects such as Vedat Bey (1873–1942) were among the first generation of professionals sent abroad to study. Like his Iranian contemporaries, he was trained at the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris, while his compatriot, Kemal Eltin Bey (1870–1927) was trained at the Charlottenburg Technische Hochschule in Berlin. Both believed in reviving older Ottoman architecture as a symbol of the reemergence of Ottoman political authority. The exigencies of a new secular Republic after 1923, however, forced the issue, and led to a rejection of Ottoman forms in favor of greater architectural abstraction.

Similar revivals could be witnessed in Iran and Egypt; however, in each case the architectural history worthy of revival was markedly different. Qajar architects were selective in their borrowing of symbols from Achaemenid (559–330 BCE) and Sasanian (224–466) architecture, in opposition to the great monuments of Islamic dynasties. Although European-style palaces and decorative motifs were also employed, imperial iconography—in the form of large sculptural programs as well as tile embellishments—was taken from pre-Islamic architecture. Similarly, architects writing and building in Egypt—in particular, Cairo—distanced themselves from the immediate history of Ottoman architecture to seek indigenous solutions from the Mamluk era (1250–1517). The “medieval” representations of contemporary architecture were certainly curious choices given the ideas of progress and reform that often accompanied them. “Modern” architecture, in contrast, was equated with the West and thus beyond the reach of local architectural expression, an attitude that would change from the 1930s onward.

During the Qajar and Ottoman periods, schools of architecture were typ-
ically led by foreigners or local elite educated in Europe. The Frenchman André Godard (1881–1969) is representative. A graduate of the École des Beaux-Arts, he worked in Iraq, Egypt, and Afghanistan before arriving in Iran. In 1928 he was appointed to the post of director of the first museum of antiquities in Tehran, the Iran Bastan Museum. Along with being placed in charge of archeological and preservation projects, he was also the first Dean of the Faculty of Fine Arts at Tehran University, directing the education of future architects. Like other foreign architects of the time, Godard found inspiration for Iran’s future in its past. For the design of the Iran Bastan Museum project, for instance, Godard collaborated with another expatriate French archeologist turned architect, Maxime Siroux (see fig. 1.4). The monumental arch at the building’s entrance did not simply emulate the Sasanian remnants at Ctesiphon, its designers believed that it improved the original with more refined details. In adapting antique forms to new building types and new political programs, Godard borrowed motifs from a range of sources and invented quasi-historical forms for new projects, much as archaeological artifacts were decontextualized to fit vitrines and historical timelines in the museums he directed. In many ways, Godard’s designs were congruent with the larger contours of eclecticism. Other architects, in Europe and the United States as well as in the Middle East, made use of historical form in an attempt to adapt to modern circumstances.

Mohsen Foroughi (1927–1982) is representative of those architects originally from the Middle East but trained in Europe and dedicated to bringing Western practices to their homelands. He studied at the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris and returned to Iran soon afterward to launch his architectural career. Although having little practical experience, he had acquired the École’s signature sensitivity to historical form and compositional virtuosity, and so was immediately welcomed into government service and soon won important commissions, such as the Faculty of Technology at Tehran University, built with Maxime Siroux (see fig. 1.5). Foroughi’s rationalist approach to design and his use of more abstract forms contrasted with the work of older colleagues. His buildings are adorned with a minimum of ornament, and the historical references are restrained—evident, for example, in the limited use of glazed tiles at the entrance to his Iranian Senate building in Tehran. Unlike Godard’s Iran Bastan Museum, built in brick, Foroughi turned to reinforced concrete for his public commissions, which included hospitals, ministries, and bank buildings. The use of concrete may be seen as an important deviation from the use of the traditional material, one that pointed to the iconic role of modern architecture in the nationalist ideology.

In Turkey, the early proponents of a new style that based its progressive posture partly on a rejection of historical form were imported from Europe. Rather than romanticizing local cultural heritage, like the previous generation, they brought with them the functionalist emphasis of a developing modern movement spurred by industrialization and rapid urbanization, as well as the background of European classicism and its long-standing values of symmetry and monumentality. The German planner Hermann Jansen (1869–1947) was invited to design and implement the master plan for the new capital, Ankara. He was followed by the Swiss Ernst Egli (1893–1974), who was brought in as the head of the Academy of Fine Arts. Egli’s designs were self-consciously abstract and aloof from any local context, embodying a kind of architectural self-determination—that is, form generated from function and methods of construction—that would mirror Atatürk’s ideals of a nation free from Ottoman malfeasance.

Subsequent Turkish architects incorporated this official nationalist aesthetic into their “new architecture,” which featured cubic forms and a fondness for grids: a language of rationalized form evoked the clarity and single-mindedness of the new government. Much of these architects’ cultural authority resided in their international experience, either as émigrés and foreign experts, or as professionals trained in foreign schools. Their education enabled them to import the motifs and
idealized Turkish house that he conceptualized after encountering in Germany publications of Frank Lloyd Wright’s prairie houses in Illinois. The heightened status of émigré or foreign-trained architects would continue after World War II, although such figures were often engaged with larger-scale planning efforts, such as Constantin Doxiades, and in many instances evinced an overriding concern for technological solutions based on universal physical facts, such as strength of materials, without explicit cultural references. Ultimately, the émigré or foreign-trained architect turned out to be a figure with limited historical appeal and only one of a number of ways to represent or embody international mobility.

As the preceding examples suggest, two design approaches prevailed in the early-twentieth-century Middle East: selective adaptation of historical forms to suit new building programs, and experimentation with the abstracting tendencies then emerging internationally. In many instances, combining these approaches resulted in designs that could recapitulate an ideal of nationhood rooted in cultural heritage, yet progressive and growing. Alongside the cultural constructions of archeologists and art historians, the conceptual spectrum of these approaches helped direct and frame the building of nations.

The World War II ascendance of an international style of modern architecture was characterized by cubic massing and elemental, unornamented forms, along with a present-tense commitment to the most advanced materials and methods of construction. As the editors of Progressive Architecture insisted in 1948: “Modern design—design of our time—is not a style. It is a solution to modern problems in modern terms.”46 In other words, modernism was intimately related to the vital spirit of the industrial age. It was the logical outcome, in aesthetic terms, both of modernization—a network of infrastructures that underpinned an advanced material civilization that included mass sanitation, mass housing, and mass transportation, and of modernity—the acceptance of systemic societal change triggered not simply by technological developments, but by the embrace of change itself as a constituent factor of everyday life. Nations that had become politically independent if not exactly free of foreign influence typically intensified their modernization program in an effort to keep pace with neighboring countries and with world opinion. This international style of modern architecture contributed in several ways to the continuing construction of a cultural concept of the Middle East: through its claims to a universal applicability that cast the Middle East as one in a series of successful instances of modernism taking root in distinct locales.

methods of Western Europe, thereby helping to make the dominant political force in the region the cultural standard as well. Although such figures were channels to Western practices, their expertise seemed to be self-contained and therefore transportable, and their choice of locale in which to practice appeared to demonstrate self-determination and to personify global citizenship. The émigré or foreign expert was thus a representative figure of modernity, with transnational experience a prerequisite to regional inflections within a larger modernism, and with local rootings of modern architecture vindicating its universal ambitions. The Turkish architect Sedad Eldem stands out in this context for working out his modernist designs through an
by repositioning historical motifs in relation to modern practice; and by focusing design attention on generalized, supposedly regional themes, such as a hot climate, which could be mitigated by a modern approach.

The dissemination of values held to be both Western and universal was a keynote of international politics after World War II, with the United Nations emblematic of such aspirations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, approved in 1948 by the United Nations' General Assembly, which included some seven Middle Eastern countries, stressed rights such as personal privacy, private property, leisure, access to social services, freedom of speech, free choice in marriage, and free choice in nationality. The United Nations approved a "symbolic figure" for the teaching of its universal ideals, a de-sacralized everyman standing atop a globe that is likewise featureless but for its gridded surface (see fig. 1.6). In terms drawn directly from the Declaration, this figure "represents all of us, everyone on earth, whoever we are, without distinction of any kind such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or any other status." The power of this unmarked monad is its presumption of a universal humanity underlying cultural differences, which become then mere circumstance. As an anticipation of impending individuation and a cipher for pure possibility, it stands as well for another, related ideal, namely, that of economic development. Indeed, an unquestioned faith in the goodness of development, in terms of both new goods and markets for global capital and material and social benefits for local populations, is an often overlooked but nonetheless fundamental aspect of modernism. International institutions such as the United Nations were crucial in helping to articulate and promulgate such beliefs. Of course, declaring universal rights and implementing them turned out to be entirely different matters.

An architectural accord with such ideals was evident in the design of the United Nations' Secretariat building itself, begun in 1947. As Sibel Bozdag notes in her essay, the elegant glass-walled slab was the leading symbol of a "new supranational aesthetic of bureaucratic and technocratic efficiency" that evoked a prosperous future precisely by forgoing cultural references. The abstracted forms of modern architecture seemed to herald wider participation in society by sponsoring a symbolic franchise accessible to all social strata, in contrast with, say, the ornate and costly ornament of traditional elites. It signified traits common to an economic class, rather than to kin or ethnic origin. In terms of actual construction programs in the Middle East, corollaries to the Declaration include an emphasis on mass housing and attempts to visualize the city in its entirety and to plan for future urban growth.

Fig. 1.6. "Symbolic Figure,” from Stephen Fentich and Phillip Andrews, The United Nations: Blueprint for Peace (Philadelphia: John C. Winston Publishing, 1951).
Also evident is the use of a common language of stripped cubic forms and greater attention to questions of building type, along with a new role for the architect, who shifted from providing custom designs for the elite to a more socially central role of accommodating the larger polity.

In the Middle East particularly, a central tenet of postwar modernism—the irrelevance of the past for the problems of the present—swiftly came into conflict with an earlier ideal of nationhood rooted in ethnic genealogy but growing toward material progress. The “flying carpet” entry canopy at the 1935 Istanbul Hilton Hotel, by the American architectural firm of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill in collaboration with Sedad Eldem, for instance, evoked an orientalist fantasy, but it was an ancillary flourish to a grid of rooms and a sequence of pools, lawns, and lounges serving burgers and soda that was, as Bozdoğan notes, “the paradigm of benevolent and democratic capitalist society.” In such ways, traditional forms were reintroduced by modernism itself, the immediately recognizable motifs could appear as proof of their persistence, however denatured. Thus, modern architecture, when it took up some notion of local heritage, could represent itself as the healing praxis for that which it had injured.

A “burden of representation”—a term we feel aptly describes this situation—strained both tendencies, as all architects in service to new nations tried to find forms that would make sense of the novel configurations of land marshaled under new flags and the varied combinations of ethnic groups that were expected to cohere under new systems of law. It was a task that occupied twentieth-century architects and builders in the Middle East in ways profoundly different than before, and despite important similarities, in ways strikingly different from those of their contemporaries in Europe. Although similar questions regarding a modern architecture—that is, an architecture aesthetically commensurate with modern society—likewise troubled European architecture, in the Middle East they seem to refract and turn in upon themselves. Among the questions that can be asked and that continue to be relevant to students and practitioners today are these: How does one build for a culture that is grounded in rich history and in strong continuing traditions and also trying to establish a distance with that history? How might one represent a culture to itself as a means of establishing what that culture might become? And how can one make use of an architectural paradigm that has already marked a culture as unequal, or at least lagging behind on an evolutionary track, to now represent that culture as a political equal among others like it?

Greater emphasis after World War II on technological solutions is evident in the attention architects gave to finding ways to mitigate the climate. Climate had been growing in importance in Western universities as an academic subject related to human welfare. But its adoption as a primary design problem helped to consolidate a sense of the unity of the Middle East at the same time that modernism could be represented as being indifferent to political boundaries, much like the climate itself. Although always subject to local conditions, climate is both global and trans-historical. As Josep Lluís Sert, architect of the 1955 American Embassy in Baghdad, suggested, climate is one of several “eternal factors” most deserving of the architect’s attention. Modern architecture could appear as a technical response to facts of nature, rather than as a displacement of more traditional accommodations to patterns of weather. However sensible, long-standing customs, such as adapting activities to the daily and seasonal path of the sun, could be seen as un-self-reflective responses to weather, in contrast to modernism’s rational analyses and all-encompassing solutions. In the long run, however, design rationales based on an appeal to climate failed to distinguish one political entity from another.

A postwar emphasis on technological approaches to design also meant that architects would tend to focus on specifically modern issues, such as accommodating automobiles, or on distinctly architectural problems, such as the physical properties and aesthetic implications of new materials. With a mandate to be modern driving them, many architects were predisposed to the use of those materials that served their professional agenda. At times this could lead to rather strained assertions. In support of his embassy design, for instance, Sert claimed he had used concrete because it was a local material, although it had not been made in Baghdad until 1952 and was in any case in short supply, as was the timber needed for formwork. His decision to use steel for the Embassy’s window sash, he said, was in response to the local problem of termites. In 1957, looking back on a decade of building in Iraq, Ellen Jawdat, an architect and the wife of Iraqi architect Nizar Jawdat, whom she met when both studied at Harvard, wrote that modernism had forced a divide between an architecture “which is technically possible and that which can economically be achieved under local building conditions.” An architect could be modern only by choosing the former. Concrete, for example, was important for iconographic as well as functional reasons, whereas brick bore no significance for modernism. For architects, this mindset would favor one sort of material over another, such as concrete (modern) over brick (traditional), even when the use of brick would have been the most efficient use of existing materials and existing skilled labor.

The effect of what seem at first to have been merely aesthetic decisions
turned out to be enormous. In Iraq, local officials and foreign observers worried about a shortage of skilled labor that would hobble or at least slow modernization. But even Lord Salter, a distinguished British politician and former minister for economic affairs, acting in the early 1950s as consultant to the Iraq Development Board, noted that labor could only be said to be in short supply in relation to planned development. In Iraq, he said, politicians were beholden to a Western model of industrial development that emphasized ways to "utilize fully the country's potential physical resources rather than to increase the welfare of its people."⁴⁴ Decisions by architects channel the use of physical resources, sometimes, as Salter suggests, to the disadvantage of other issues, such as full employment.

At the same time that these developments helped to reinforce modernism's core principles, they also redefined them: attention to climate led to an often monumental emphasis on technique, which, being ill-suited for the range of building tasks necessary to modernization, began to strain its underlying technological determinism. Questions of architectural representation remained inescapable in the Middle East because the primary issue was to make modernity and independence manifest, to visibly demonstrate with material form claims of political parity with former colonial and hegemonic Western powers. Modernist flirtations with vernacular architecture in the West were extended to a more explicit concern for questions of historical and regional context, matters that were paramount to nations attempting to articulate their legitimacy and importance.⁴⁵ Preserving tradition and modernization were posited as oppositional goals that could not be resolved. Although much of this effort would involve new infrastructural projects like roads and railways, shipping facilities, airports, urban water and sanitation systems, and so on, the most visible portions nearly always involved architecture. Whether providing housing for immigrants streaming into cities, or a monumental government center, new buildings were both the means and the very symbol of participation in Western ideals of progress and development promoted to foreign investors and aggressive neighbors.

Issues regarding representation also came to the fore through the work of the Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy. Like many of his colleagues, Fathy explored Beaux-Arts-inspired designs through much of the 1930s, but later he turned his attention to housing for the rural poor, the use of traditional materials such as mud brick, and vernacular traditions. Even his evident interest in addressing issues of climate was pursued through careful manipulation of orientation and the size and location of openings, the use of shading devices, and generous courtyards that would be at least partially shaded throughout the day. Although his 1948 project for New Gourna was criticized in terms of its economic viability, it was richly imagined and led to a series of important positions for Fathy advising the Egyptian government, as well as consulting with other architects across the Middle East. The Iraqi architect Rifai Chadirji, to take another example, studied architecture in London, but upon his return to Baghdad in 1952 he became involved with preserving the urban fabric that was often threatened by modernization projects. In the following years, he worked to incorporate vernacular motifs with new materials and a larger scale of modern architecture. Iraq Consult, the firm he established, became one of the region's most important architectural practices.³⁴

Issues of representation were only sharpened with the rising power of the United States in the years following World War II. In the American Embassy building program, for instance, a number of architects, many of whom were not American by birth, were asked to represent the United States to the non-American audience of the host country as a powerful industrialized nation that was nonetheless sensitive to the local interests of its host country. Embassy architects were asked to express "such qualities as dignity, strength, and neighborly sympathy." Issues of representation were explicit and internally contradictory, and architects struggled to protect core modernist principles of subordinating representation to practical matters of function and structure even as they added ornamental flourishes to indicate "neighborly sympathy."⁴⁴ What one author called "Ornamented Modern," had, he wrote in 1959, "crystallized, in large measure, as the result of a U.S. State Department policy regarding the construction of embassies abroad."⁴⁵ Questions of ornament and representation in modern architecture were triggered not by the 1960s postmodern critique of modernism, but emerged in the context of decolonization and nationalism, in an optimistic if ambiguous confidence in modern architecture to simultaneously represent the rooted particularities of a given place and population as well as their progress toward future prospects.

Narratives of modernism in the Middle East have by and large relied upon categories based on Western experience. Temporal divisions such as "prewar" or "postwar" reflect systemic changes that took place in the West following World War II, such as Europe's enormous reconstruction effort and the transformation of the American economy from military to consumer goods and its emergence upon the global stage. Such labels also reflect an implicit belief in the homogeneity of temporal experience. That is to say, the present is itself defined by the rapid and incessant changes wrought by modernity; therefore,
to participate in the present means to embrace change and to demonstrate that embrace with cultural signs and material forms.

Although affected by World War II, the experience of the Middle East was different, attesting to the tenuous coherence of the very idea of a Middle East. Iran and Turkey were already independent nations in the 1920s, whereas a number of North African nations remained colonies into the 1950s. Somewhere in between was Iraq—autonomous after World War I, officially independent in 1922 but still effectively under British influence, occupied by the British throughout the Second World War, re-independent in 1947, and only freed from British authority in 1958 after a coup led by Abdul Karim Qassim. With many such changes of administration, grand modernization projects were initiated, redirected, or shut down. With each iteration of national identity, different actors appeared in an altered context, and newly independent governments made as much or as little use of new technologies and cultural heritage as did their colonial predecessors. Considered across the wide range of the Middle East, such a pattern amounts to a kind of punctuated development: rather than being explained by a gradual or even a fitful assimilation of Western practices, modernism in the Middle East evolved in a geographically and temporally disjointed manner. New symbols were brandished and old ones recycled; various modernisms were accepted, amended, rejected.

Perhaps the most important development since the 1970s has been the resurgence of Islam as a touchstone of nationalistic discourse. This is best exemplified in Iran, but is also evident throughout the Middle East and South Asia. In countries as distinct as Turkey and Algeria, Islam has been an increasingly galvanizing form of socio-political expression. Religious identity has re-emerged in political and civic discourse and has thus joined individual status and national or ethnic origin as a major factor in the production and study of architecture. Religious identification has lead to a new, hybrid type of modern architecture, evident not only in the Middle East but in other global contexts from India to the United States.

New patrons promoting religious ideology as a source of political agency have sponsored wholesale reinterpretations of traditional building types. This trend is unlike earlier ones involving the application of traditional motifs onto contemporary structures and state patronage in service to modernization. It is also unlike the token ornamentalism and corporate sponsorship evident in buildings like the Istanbul Hilton. Two examples can begin to illustrate this new development. The first is the tomb of the patriarch of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 1988), whose body is interred in an enormous structure on the outskirts of Tehran. The building is in the form of a traditional Shi'i shrine, but it is built entirely of contemporary materials such as concrete and prefabricated metal, with a space-frame interior (see fig. 1.7). The state-sponsored tomb was overseen by Khomeini's son, Ahmad, and designed by the architect Mohammed Tehrani. It functions simultaneously as a religious edifice and a state monument, frequented as often by pilgrims as by diplomats. A similar bridging of temporal and formal boundaries is seen in the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara (1967–87). The massive mosque, with a parking garage and shopping mall in its lower levels, is similar to the tomb of Khomeini in evoking a traditional style (see fig. 1.8). But unlike the case of the imperial patrons who built Ottoman mosques in previous centuries, the Kocatepe Mosque was financed by the populist Welfare Party (Refa Partesi). In both these cases, that of the Khomeini tomb and that of the Kocatepe Mosque, religion, as co-opted by the state, is the driving factor in the architectural program. Similarly, traditional rather than modern form is the starting, if not exactly the concluding, point for design.

Critics of the populist architecture these buildings represent consider them reactionary and anti-modern. But these same critics can laud the translation of traditional motifs into modern terms evident in a building such as
is now migrating to the West. The hybrid buildings that result from this process in cities all over the world require a sharpened focus on the present and provide a fresh opportunity to rethink the future of modernism and architecture.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The central ambition of Modernism and the Middle East is to serve as a set of detailed case studies that contextualize architectural form and practice within the discourses of national and postcolonial identity as they have developed in the Middle East. But if the strength of an edited volume of essays when taken as a whole is the variety of perspectives that respond to a common set of questions, then the editors’ charge will inevitably be to emphasize the areas of congruency without compromising the range and depth of individual points of view. To achieve this balancing act, we have set thematic and geographic boundaries that focus this volume as well as limit it. As a whole, some degree of temporal breadth is reached by including essays that touch upon every decade of the twentieth century. Similarly, nations from Libya to Iraq come up for discussion, and thus offer geographic breadth. Four essays focus on Mandate Palestine, Israel, and the Occupied Territories, which reflects not only the current high level of scholarship on these places, but also their political—and perhaps, as mentioned above, conceptual—importance to the region. They also demonstrate how a single physical location is subject to conflicting political claims and historical narratives generated to legitimate those claims. In other words, the geographic coordinates may remain more or the less the same for these four essays, but the “place” is in every instance quite different. While the tension between regional relevance and international validity structures many of the individual essays, Modernism and the Middle East as a whole aims to transcend that dichotomy to arrive at a richer and more dynamic way to understand a region that is the site both of deep traditions and of rapid modernization. The collected essays vividly demonstrate the political dimensions of creating the built environment, of subsequently inhabiting it, and, finally, of deploying it for symbolic ends.

Modernism and the Middle East begins with a section entitled “Colonial Constructions,” in which the politics of domination are situated within the interaction between Europe and the Middle East. The two essays presented here question the balance between tradition and modernity that in the 1930s was seen by many to be the goal of European colonial patronage in the Middle East. Annabel Wharton, in her essay “Jerusalem Remade,” shows how the
region was reconfigured as a haven of traditional architecture, in contrast with the new building campaigns of Jewish settlers and in preparation for European pilgrims who would expect modern comforts along with the historic and holy urban fabric. Wharton makes evident the crucial role of representation in the modern-day shaping of Jerusalem as an ancient city with a visible architectural heritage serving as an analog of religious insight. Jerusalem, in other words, was remade in the 1930s so that Protestant pilgrims, in particular, could bear witness to their own religious sentiments.

Brian McLaren’s essay, “Modern Architecture, Preservation and the Discourse on Local Culture in Italian Colonial Libya,” describes Italian appropriation of Libyan architecture from the late 1920s to the late 1930s, as Italians attempted to legitimate their occupation of Libya through architecture. McLaren reveals the racial underpinnings of the sophisticated and self-conscious rationalist discourse of Italian architects that guided architectural policy in Libya, and then traces those policies as they shifted from scholarly and preservation-minded nodes to an increasingly didactic and eclectic use of Libyan formal motifs. Whereas earlier designs had been abstract and in keeping with developments in Italy, later designs were more traditional in form and conceived largely for Italian tourists, who were proving to be an increasingly important part of the colony’s economy.

The second section, “Building the Nation,” takes as its premise that the primary agenda for twentieth-century architects and builders in the Middle East was to construct an architectural vocabulary for nations newly liberated either from European colonial or local imperial regimes. In all, the underlying theme is one of representation: political, architectural, and ideological. The first two essays focus on the role of architects and institutions in mediating the various encounters of modernism with older ways of building. As Magnus Bernhardsson argues in “1001 Fantasies: Development, Architecture, and Modernizing the Past in Baghdad, 1950–1958,” institutions are devices that embody these contradictions, as they are simultaneously predicated on programs of modernization and development and embedded in the society and place that is going to be developed. Bernhardsson reveals that the individual architects’ proposals for the greater Baghdad plan, sponsored by the Iraqi Development Board (IDB), were secondary to the plan itself, with a mandate for Western-styled development the common underpinning of any specific proposal. The IDB programs emphasized the government’s ambivalence toward its own cultural inheritance, as well as the perils of elite sponsorship of a conspicuous building program aimed at a weakly defined citizenry that may not comprehend or approve of the government’s ambitions. As Bernhardsson shows, the majority of Iraqis were unaware of the IDB’s activities or of its mandate for change. Panayiota Pyla’s essay, “Baghdad’s Urban Restructuring, 1958: Constantinios Doxiadies, Aesthetics, and the Politics of Nation Building,” examines the IDB plan for Baghdad in greater detail, focusing in particular on the work of the Greek architect and planner Constantinios Doxiadies. Pyla shows how Doxiadis’s simultaneous claims of technocratic objectivity and cultural sensitivity meshed with those of the IDB. She reads the Baghdad plan closely to trace the various transformations by which specific cultural traits were isolated by the planners and then accommodated in fixed urban forms. In “Democracy, Development, and the Americanization of Turkish Architectural Culture in the 1950s,” Sibel Bozdoğan surveys the shift in Turkey in the 1950s from Europe to the United States as a reference point for modern architectural practices that became a progressive counterpoint to vestigial orientalist ideas, a hopeful amalgam that evaporated in 1960 following a military coup. She follows individual designers and signal projects, most notably Sedad Eldem and his work on the Hilton Hotel in Istanbul, to argue that there were as many modernisms as there were modern architects.

The following three essays sharpen the book’s focus by examining the case of Israel and Palestine, a region that, in terms of the premises of Modernism and the Middle East, is founded on a tension between its historic past and its promising future. Roy Kozlovsky’s essay, “Temporal States of Architecture: The Provisional Infrastructure of Immigration in Israel,” argues that the new Israeli government managed the rapid immigration of the late 1940s and 1950s by appropriating modernist tenets of transitoriness and ephemeralism. Kozlovsky shows how government agencies were able to abrogate private property rights in the name of the state’s larger transition to stability. With modernism decisively established as the visible vocabulary of progress and material development, professional debate in the 1960s regarding landmark projects in Jerusalem began to shift toward a revived interest in traditional forms and a picturesque sensibility, as described by Alona Nitzan-Shiftan in her essay, “Modernisms in Conflict: Architecture and Cultural Politics in Post-1967 Jerusalem.” An international advisory committee, relying on a modernist posture of objective disinterest, argued for greater use of historical references, while an Israeli team of designers called for an unabashed modernism to represent the capital of a progressive nation that was focused unblinkingly on the future. Finally, by looking at the ways Palestinians have memorialized the 1956 massacre at Kufr Qasim, which was at first denied by Israel and then summarily rushed through its military court, Waled Khleif and Susan Sly-
Orientalism, in their essay "Palestinian Remembrance Days and Practices," move well beyond the use of built form as a kind of civic representation to reach an ideal of "historical justice" that nonetheless centers on the importance of place and cultural memory. Rather than recognize the tragedy with a memorial that would, in any case, have been compromised, even if it had been allowed, the making and reciting of poetry became a ritual practice of memorialization. Memory, the authors imply, can become monumental even in the absence of any built monuments.

The concluding section, "Overviews and Openings," reestablishes a broader outlook. In "Global Ambition and Local Knowledge," Gwendolyn Wright emphasizes the tension between the modern and the traditional in Beirut, Cairo, and Riyadh, mostly in the period of the 1950s and 1960s. As she sheds light on the intellectual constructs and effects of modernism, Wright also lays out essential questions of global processes and local agency—the essence of postcolonial tensions—that remain pressing in our own day. Nezar AlSayyad’s essay, "From Modernism to Globalization: The Middle East in Context," brings issues discussed in the preceding essays to the present day. He retracts how the idea of a cohesive Middle East was articulated and reinforced in the twentieth century, even as he shows how varied examples how tenuous this geopolitical entity truly is. Pointing toward greater rather than less cultural differentiation in the process of globalization, AlSayyad confirms the need to look beyond formal similarities to comprehend the many unique articulations of cultural identity in the place that is called the "Middle East."

NOTES


2. For a collection of essays that deal with various aspects of modernization and the Middle East, see Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson, eds., The Modern Middle East: A Reader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

3. Crimea, e.g., was taken in 1774 by the Russians, while Egypt was occupied by Napoleon’s army in 1798. In 1828 the Russians further asserted their military strength by absorbing Georgia and parts of Iranian Azerbaijan.


5. Libya was occupied by the Italians in 1911, and in 1914 Egypt became a protectorate of Britain. In addition, the kingdom of Morocco became a protectorate of France.


10. The primary task for European colonialists was to inventory their newly procured assets, for which they used scholarly tools such as more-or-less standardized survey formats, with their structuring biological metaphors of stylistic birth, flowering, and decay, and the catalogue, a format generally understood to be authoritative for fitting specific fragments of past art into grand narratives of cultural progress. The aesthetic categories and intellectual preoccupations of European scholars determined both the merit and the historical value of the entire field of Islamic art and architecture. Grand imperial projects, such as palace complexes and mosques, attracted the most attention, while sites of what would now be termed "popular culture," such as local shrines and bazaars, received little notice, except in discussions about the mythical "Islamic City." At that time, some monuments were destroyed only to be rebuilt in what were deemed more authentic ways, while others were fabricated anew on the basis of the nationalist rediscovery of their importance. In Iran, Susa and other pre-Islamic sites were studied from as early as 1884, but it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that much attention was given to Islamic sites.

11. Herzfeld subsequently joined the German dig at Assur and completed a dissertation on the Achaemenid palace at Pasargade, in Iran. Still a young man,
This material has been explored by Talin Grigor in "Cultivat(ing) Modernities: The Society for National Heritage, Political Propaganda, and Public Architecture in Twentieth-Century Iran," Ph.D. diss., MIT, 2005.


19. Muqarnas 8 (1990) is a special issue dedicated to the life and legacy of K. A. C. Creswell.


23. The dedication to King Fu'ad on the original 1933 manuscript of Early Muslim Architecture, is edited out of the 1969 reprint.


25. In Tehran, the Dār al-Funūn, or Academy of Arts and Sciences, had already been established in 1851, but by 1861 fine arts and painting were included in the curriculum.


27. For more on Qajar architecture, see Jennifer Scarce, "Ancestral Themes in the Art of Qajar Iran, 1785–1925," in Islamic Art in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Doris Behrens-Abouseif and Stephen Vernoit (Leiden: Brill, 2006).


29. A museum was already established in the Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1915, but it was deemed inadequate for the purposes of a national institution. For a further introduction to Godard, see Éve Gran-Aymier and Mina Marefat, “Goddard, André,” Encyclopedia Iranica Web site, www.iranica.com.

30. Well-known examples would include the Woolworth Tower (1913), Cass Gilbert’s Gothic Revival skyscraper in New York, and McKim, Mead, and White’s Classical Municipal Building (1915), also in New York.


32. For more on Jansen, Egli, and others, see Bernd Nicolai, Moderne und Exil: Deutschsprachige Architekten in der Türkei, 1933–1955 (Berlin: Verlag für Bauwesen, 1998), as well as Sibel Bozdoğan, Modernism and Nation Building.

33. When a native architectural intelligence was discovered, it was not in the built legacy of centuries of Ottoman rule, but in the more ancient cultures of Anatolia, such as the Hittites. A good example is the Anıt Kabir mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, built by Emin Onat and Orhan Arda, and completed in 1953.


46. "The mega-rhetoric of developmental modernization," as Arjun Appadurai put it, is crosscut synchronically by media narratives and diachronically by the fitful implementation of actual modernization projects (see Arjun Appadurai, "Here and Now," in *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996], 9–10).

47. Mohammed Tehrani is criticized by local Iranian architects for "selling out" to the Islamist regime. This criticism is similar to the one directed at the Turkish architect Vedat Dalokay, the architect of such buildings as the mosque of Shah Faisal in Islamabad, Pakistan (see Kishwar Rizvi, "Religious Icon and National Symbol: The Tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran," *Mas'ar* 20 [2003]).